This paper examines empirically the effect firm reputation has on the determinants of debt maturity. Utilising data from European primary bond market between 1999 and 2005, I find that the maturity choice of issuers with a higher reputation is less sensitive to macroeconomic conditions, market credit risk-premiums, prevailing firm credit quality and size of the debt issue. The annualised coupon payments are shown to be a significant factor in determining the debt maturity and reveal a monotonously increasing relationship between credit quality and debt maturity once controlled for. Finally, I show that issuers lacking a credit rating have an implied credit quality positioned between investment-grade and speculative-grade debt.
INTRODUCTION
This paper examines empirically the effect firm reputation has on the determinants of debt maturity. Theoretical papers provide us with variable projections on a firm's choice of debt maturity, ranging from the matching of asset-maturity to tax-relief benefits and comprising various signalling effects based on information asymmetry and agency cost theories (see e.g. Myers (1977) , Brick and Ravid (1985) , Flannery (1986) , Diamond (1991a)). Diamond (1991b) argues that reputation helps alleviate information asymmetry problems, since reputation implies lower degrees of adverse selection to be present in the future. While empirical research has mainly focused on testing these theories in isolation, my foremost contribution to the existing literature is combining the reputation argument with the debt maturity literature and showing that an issuer's reputation in itself affects the determinants of debt maturity.
Following Guedes and Opler (1996) and Bali and Skinner (2006) , I study incremental debt issues, thereby departing from another strand of literature on debt maturity which looks at the entire liability structure on a firm's balance sheet. The advantage of the incremental approach lies in that individual observations on debt maturity are exact and easily identified, while a weakness may be the wide variation in debt issue characteristics. To limit this disadvantage, I incorporate controls for a variety of debt issue features into my model. Utilising data from the European primary bond market between 1999 and 2005, I confirm previous empirical findings by Guedes and Opler (1996) , Baker, Greenwood and Wurgler (2003) and Bali and Skinner (2006) that firms choose the maturity of their debt with changes in the level and slope of the yield curve, similar to conclusions that can be drawn from a survey among US chief financial officers conducted by Graham and Harvey (2001) . However, while this is true in the aggregate, the sensitivity to these macroeconomic variables and market credit risk premiums differ significantly depending on an issuer's reputation in the market, which I proxy by its frequency to issue bonds.
I also provide evidence of the gradual development of the European debt capital market.
Before the introduction of the common currency, most corporate bond issues where made by firms of highest credit qualities (see e.g. Pagano and von Thadden (2004) , p.10). After 1999 and the creation of the Euro-denominated debt capital market, issues of lower credit qualities have dominated the primary bond market, with fully new opportunities to access market-based funding emerging to speculative-grade issuers.
The new market place has also been quick to extend the term to maturity available to firms seeking corporate funding in terms of debt capital. By focusing the research on non-financial corporate issuers, I specifically answer questions about the funding of these firms and industries under the new currency and its capital market. Diamond (1993) shows that firms maximize their debt capacity by bearing short-term senior debt and long-term junior debt. Parallel to Bali and Skinner (2006) , I find empirical evidence to confirm Diamond's prediction that debt of junior status has longer maturity than senior debt.
Additionally, I contribute further to the literature by showing that by controlling for coupon payments, a monotonically decreasing risk-maturity relationship is observed for debt issues, while omitting this control variable, as done in earlier work, produces on non-monotonic relationship between credit quality and debt maturity similar to Diamond (1991a) . Thus, the credit quality alone is not a key determinant of debt maturity, but in combination with the contractual coupon payments they materially affect the maturity of issued debt. Finally, through this methodology, I am also able to establish an implied credit quality for issuers lacking a credit rating by a credit rating agency, which gives further insight about the firms utilising the bond market for funding.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
In this chapter I present the central theories on debt maturity. As the emphasis in this paper lies in factors concerning information asymmetries, I will spend more time discussing related predictions on debt maturity and only briefly touch other strands of theories. The academic literature basically recognises four main classes of theories on the determinants of debt maturity, namely the maturity-matching hypothesis, the tax hypothesis, the agency cost hypothesis, the signalling and liquidity risk hypothesis.
Subordination has further implication on debt maturity. Each of the hypotheses provides variable projections on the choice of debt maturity.
Perhaps the most intuitive of the theories is the maturity-matching hypothesis by Myers (1977) , which argues that a firm should match the maturity of its assets with the liabilities it carries. Guedes and Opler (1996) , Stohs and Mauer (1996) and the qualitative survey by Graham and Harvey (2001) find empirical evidence to support the hypothesis. Together with the tax hypothesis (see Brick and Ravid (1985) ), which states that corporate debt maturity is positively correlated with yield curve movements due to obtained tax shield benefits as interest rates rise, these two theories reflect specific firmlevel asset characteristics and functions of corporate tax ratios on the choice of debt maturity.
The third pillar in the theoretical framework on debt maturity is the agency cost hypothesis. Myers (1977) argues that managers, acting on behalf of equity holders, may limit investments since benefits of the exercised growth options may be absorbed by bondholders as payments on risky debt. As a result, stockholders may even reject positive net present value projects. The underinvestment problem can be alleviated by limiting the total amount of debt or by issuing short-term debt, which matures before the growth options are exercised and can be re-priced to reflect new information. In other words, firms holding a wide opportunity set of investments should issue short-term debt. This hypothesis is, however, only supported by weak evidence in the empirical studies by Stohs and Mauer (1996) and Graham and Harvey (2001) .
While less tangible, models on information asymmetries help explain debt maturity decisions based on the perceived credit quality of the issuing firm. Flannery (1986) suggests that the debt maturity structure of firm signals private information about the quality of the firm. In a world without costs, a low-quality firm can replicate the debt maturity choices of a high-quality firm. Introducing costs creates a separating equilibrium; utilising shorter maturity debt generates higher costs due to more frequent refinancing, thus separating high-quality firms from low-quality firms, where the former will issue at the short end of the maturity spectrum to signal higher quality, while the latter, unable to pay the reoccurring transaction costs, is forced to issue long-term debt. Kale and Noe (1990) show that the separating equilibrium can exist even without transaction costs.
Diamond (1991a) presents a similar, albeit non-monotonic relationship between debt maturity and firm quality based on liquidity risk; issuing short-term debt increases the roll-over frequency of debt, thus exposing the firm to greater uncertainty on the availability of funds at each maturity date. High-quality firms, confident of their credit quality and the likelihood of continued funding, will issue short-term debt. The risk of facing an illiquid market gives firms with a lower credit quality an incentive to issue longer term debt. However, "circumventing" liquidity risk by issuing long-term debt may not be an option for very low-quality firms. Instead, they are screened out of the long-term maturity segment due to increasing credit risk premiums further along the credit curve and are, as a consequence, restricted to issue shorter-term debt. Short-term debt is therefore issued by either high-or very low-quality firms, while issuers with credit qualities between these extremes prefer long-term funding. Both Guedes and Opler (1996) and Stohs and Mauer (1996) find empirical evidence supporting Diamond's and Flannery's models.
Furthermore, theory suggests an inverse relationship between the seniority of debt and debt maturity. Diamond (1993) shows that firms maximize their debt capacity by bearing short-term senior debt and long-term junior debt. Short-term senior debt is more information sensitive and preferred if firms anticipate positive news to arrive. It also gives control rights to lenders in case of default, at which point lenders prefer to liquidate. Thus, too much short-term debt leads lenders to liquidate too often. By bearing long-term junior debt while allowing additional future debt to be raised, the borrower can alleviate unwanted liquidation. Bali and Skinner (2006) provide empirical evidence confirming Diamond's prediction.
Problems associated with information asymmetries are predominant when negotiating debt agreements and remain present over the entire lifespan of such contracts. Firms may try to signal their counterparty quality through behaviour, but in many cases such actions are replicated by the peers from which the firms try to differentiate themselves. Diamond (1991b) argues that reputation "can eventually deal with moral hazard" 1 because it implies that less adverse selection will be present in the future. Reputation may therefore be a significant and distinguishable way of alleviating some of the information asymmetry problems. While equity markets and stock exchange regulation obligate their members to reveal information to equity investors and thereby bridging information gaps, the same is not obvious in OTC-type bond markets. The hypothesis I propose suggests therefore that more frequent debt issuers gain from visiting the capital markets regularly and are met more favourably by the investors, where my main argument is that a higher reputation allows a firm to issue debt with longer maturity.
Reoccurring debt issuance reveals information about the borrower to debt investors on a continuous basis and helps thereby deal with the information asymmetries. Berger et al. (2005) show that the average maturity of bank loans increase significantly when information asymmetries are lessened. From a theoretical perspective, my hypothesis reflects the reputation argument by Diamond (1991b) and it also makes practical sense; if a firm frequently visits the debt capital markets for funding, it reveals information about itself more often and builds up a reputation among debt investors, thus lessening information asymmetries, which in turn should be beneficial to both parties and reflected in the contractual relationship between them.
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The study is restricted to Euro-denominated fixed-rate bonds, issued by non-financial firms residing in EMU-countries and spanning a time-period beginning from the introduction of the Euro in 1999 to the year-end 2005. This choice is motivated by several factors; first, the gradual development of the Euro-denominated corporate bond market in terms of maturity spectrum available to corporate bond issuers has so far been undocumented in the literature. Second, concentrating only on non-financial issuers, 
Determining reputation
To test whether firm reputation affects the maturity of debt, I observe the frequency of issuance for each individual firm over the entire sample period. I categorise issuers as 'frequent' or 'infrequent' based on the absolute number of issues they make during the seven year sample period and perform separate model-regression for each category.
Firms with seven or more issues -equivalent to at least one issue per year on averageare categorized as frequent issuers, while those with six bond issues or less are denoted infrequent issuers. This technique may seem artificial, since the issue-frequency is observed ex post, while the hypothesis implies that reputation has an ex ante effect on debt maturity. In effect, I make the assumption that an issuer has a given reputation before the start of my sample period and that the in-sample issue-frequency is representative of previous behaviour. Lastly, I categorise one-time issuers separately, resulting in three different groups of issuers; single issuers, infrequent issuers with 2-6 debt issues and frequent issuers with 7 or more issues in total. As these threshold values are not derived from theory, but rather a result of arbitrary definition, I also report regression results for subgroups of the infrequent category in order to highlight the transitional effects an increasing reputation (issue-frequency) has on debt issues.
DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
The data set originates from the Dealogic database, containing issue-specific information on Euro-denominated bond issues made by EMU-country residents from Data on interest rates is obtained from the European Central Bank (ECB). All yields are monthly averages quoted at mid-month and weighted by the nominal outstanding amounts of national government bonds in each maturity band. This method is chosen, because at the time of announcing a debt issue, the maturity of the issue has already been selected. Hence, economic conditions affecting the maturity must have been considered prior to the announcement of a debt issue.
International Index Company produces iBoxx bond-indices, which I use for calculation of the credit risk premium between AAA-and BBB-category investment-grade bonds.
This data is available from April 1 st 1999 onwards.
3 Debt issues which have been granted a state-guarantee of repayment are also excluded. 4 Tap-issues are re-issues of a bond, executed in varying amounts and at different times, usually in response to investor demand. The main terms of the bond (issuing conditions, coupon and maturity) remain unchanged, but the issue price can vary according to market conditions. Tap-issues on bonds are thus left outside the sample, since they would induce a bias as the same bond appears multiple times in the sample. (2001), we can expect that the larger the difference between the slope and level curve, the more attractive is short term debt issuance to firms. We also notice that the peak of interest rate level in late 2000 is higher than the combination of the short-term rate plus the yield curve slope mark-up from mid-2002 onwards.
Meanwhile, the market credit risk premium has fluctuated between 0.497 and 2.192, reaching its peak in august 2002. Lastly, we observe that during the last year of the sample period, the overall issuance cost for long term debt including a credit risk premium is lower than the short-end cost of issuance in early 2001, meaning that a high quality firm issuing a short term bond in early 2001 paid a similar or higher fixed coupon than a firm of lower quality with long term maturity debt during the last years included in the sample.
In panel 2 we see that issues belonging to rating categories A and BBB are predominant among the rated issues represented in the sample. Unrated issues account for roughly 15% of the total number of issues in the sample, but their relative number seems to 6 See appendix 1 for a complete summary of the variables and related data sources.
decrease towards the end of the sample period. By contrast, there appears to be an increase in speculative-grade issues. In panel 3 we observe that the speculative-grade issuers target almost uniquely the 5-10 year maturity segments and are not present in either very long or short maturity categories, while lower investment-grade categories A and BBB utilise shorter maturities. This separation between lower investment-grade and speculative-grade issues follows Diamond (1991a) suggestion that lower quality firms issue longer term debt to minimize liquidity risk problems. Interestingly, almost twothirds of the unrated issues are shorter than five years, perhaps reflecting higher information asymmetries due to lacking credit ratings, while the highest quality firms (AAA and AA rated) issue debt in relative terms more evenly over the entire maturity spectrum.
Panel 4 graphs the distribution of issues grouped by maturity classes. Two distinct features can immediately be observed; the diminishing number and quantity of short maturity issues and the birth of bonds with a maturity exceeding 15 and 25 years. This may in part be due to the favourable interest rate environment during the latter part of the sample period, but likewise evidence of a maturing and broadening market. The development of the European bond market is visible in panel 5, which shows the average credit rating in each maturity class excluding the unrated issuers. We see that the average numeric credit rating increases, denoting lower credit quality, in almost all maturity classes over time. This is indicative of the gradual development of the debt capital markets and its ability to absorb a wider variety of debt by issuers of different credit qualities. The phenomenon is especially visible in the categories for bonds with a maturity of 10 to 15 years and 15 to 25 years. Interestingly, the longest dated bonds start with a higher average credit rating (lower credit quality), which is in part due to the relatively few bonds belonging to this category, with only 11 issues at maturities exceeding 25 years during the entire sample period. For instance, the first column in this maturity class corresponds to a single issue made by Olivetti Finance NV, which came to the market with a 30-year bond under a BBB/Baa-credit rating, equalling a numeric value of four. Nevertheless, issuers of lower investment-grade quality have made the inaugural issues of very long-dated bonds 7 . Another noteworthy characteristic is the increase in credit quality (lower numeric rating) in the shortest maturity segment towards the end of the sample period, a time characterised by low interest rates and a steep yield curve. This may again be indicative of Diamond's (1991a) argument that high-quality firms issue short when they anticipate beneficial news when coming out of a period of a generally sluggish economic environment. Alternatively, the demand for issues by the highest quality firms in the longer maturity segments may be low, as investors seek higher yields in assets of lower quality firms at times when credit risk premiums are narrow.
Finally, panel 6 of chart 1 presents the average coupon paid in each maturity class grouped by rating categories. It is apparent that longer maturity correlates positively with higher coupon payments. This is mostly true for all issues with a credit rating, while the unrated category displays a negative correlation. I believe this is a result of the diminishing presence of unrated issuers in the market, as we have seen in panel 2, combined with the fact that the majority of issues by unrated firms where initially made in the short maturity segments when interest rates were high. These unrated issuers paid thus a relatively high coupon for short maturity debt, while only a small number of unrated firms secured their funding at lower coupon rates when interest rates were lower with a slightly higher maturity. Also note that unrated issuers are completely absent from maturity classes exceeding 10 years. Another clear feature of the coupon payments is their dramatic increase when credit quality deteriorates to speculative-grade segment, a direct consequence of the higher default rates recorded for the lower quality credits. which has parallels to Diamond (1991a) non-monotonic relationship between credit quality and maturity. Thus, it would appear that the reputation of an issuer yields similar maturity characteristics as credit quality, where the highest category issues short term debt, the middle category issues long term debt and the lowest category is screened out of the long term segment and forced to issue short. We also observe that the standard deviation of maturity for both infrequent and frequent issuers is higher than for single issuers. We also note that firms lacking a credit rating issue to shortest maturity debt; unrated issuers face the highest degree of information asymmetry and may try to signal private information about their credit quality by issuing short term debt, as suggested by Flannery (1986) .
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
Employing the model presented earlier, I evaluate the determinants of debt maturity.
Columns I through IIII in (corresponding to the regression in column VII), but the authors find the risk premium variable significant when they perform separate regression for each rating category.
Controlling for both credit quality and size of the coupon on a full-sample regression as I report in column VIII captures the opposing relationships between the maturity of debt and the high-contra low-quality issuers.
Comparing columns VII and VIII, we observe the effect of omitting the COUPON variable from the model specifications; coefficients for the credit rating dummies are non-monotonously increasing with credit quality in column VII. The result is obvious;
as seen in panel 6 of the chart 1, lower quality debt must pay a higher coupon to receive funding. Excluding the coupon variable from the regression does not relate the cost of funding to debt maturity. Indeed, sample statistics show that on average, speculative-grade firms issue longer maturity debt than lower investment-grade (A and BBB) firms, while the highest quality issuers receive -on average -longest term on their debt.
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However, we wish to examine the true determinants of debt maturity, where we need to consider the coupon payments that speculative-grade issuers are required to make in order to receive such funding. We notice that the debt maturity is determined significantly by the combination of both the credit quality and coupon payments, resulting in the monotonously increasing relationship between credit rating and debt maturity. 11 We also notice a considerable increase in the adjusted R-squared value from 0.26 to 0.44 when the coupon variable is included in the regression model. All rating dummies are significant at 1% in the full model in column VIII. In addition, this methodology allows us to observe an implied credit quality for firms lacking a credit rating based on their position in the maturity spectrum, appearing between low investment-grade and high speculative-grade credit quality.
As predicted by Diamond (1993) , the coefficient of the subordinated debt dummy is positive and significant. It should be noted that all 16 subordinated debt issues were made by speculative-grade issuers, which are more likely to default on debt than investment-grade issuers. This behaviour follows likewise Diamond's predictions that junior debt is issued to alleviate liquidation in case of default.
Reputation and the determinants of debt maturity Diamond (1991b) suggests that reputation can help deal with problems involving information asymmetries. Unlike equity markets, where regulation obligates members to reveal information about them on a continuous basis, OTC-type bond markets do not have direct mechanisms for providing investors with information on a regular basis. As a result, "bondholder value" -a term synonymous with transparency and information content specifically directed to debt investors -has made a debut in recent years to cater information demands specific to debt investors. For individual debt issuers, reputation 10 Single issuers are sensitive to all three macroeconomic variables. Regression results for this group present a very noteworthy phenomenon, namely, that all the credit quality dummies are insignificant for the single issuers, indicating that regardless of their credit quality, firms are unable to obtain significantly different maturities on their debt. Or, put in another way, the low reputation of these issuers overwhelms their credit quality, restricting differentiation between the firms in terms of maturity. Also, the COUPONvariable coefficient is lower than in any other reputation group, showing that an incremental increase in coupon payments does not increase the maturity of debt as much as for issuers of higher reputation.
For infrequent issuers, all macroeconomic factors are consistently significant at 1% level, with the exception of market credit risk premium variable BBBAAA in the subgroup of firms with 4-6 bond issues in column VI. Debt status dummy SUB is found weakly significant as a determinant of debt maturity in column V, with positive and expected sign. Interestingly, the BOOKRUN-variable appears weakly significant with a negative sign in column VI. I believe this relationship is a result of a disproportionately high involvement of book-runners in sales of relatively short dated bonds in this group, a characteristic typical among large firms with many bank relationships to nurture.
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Maturity separation between different credit qualities appears strong; in general, the relationship between maturity and credit quality remains monotonically increasing with the control for coupon payments included in the regression. Speculative-grade issuers receive shorter maturity, with all coefficients negative and statistically highly significant. Due to rising cost of financing in terms of coupon payments, speculativegrade issuers are screened from the longest maturity segments, parallel to predictions by Diamond (1991a) . However, the effect of credit quality diminishes with increased firm reputation, as shown in column VI, where investment-grade credit quality dummies are all found insignificant.
Finally, column VII shows the industry fixed effects regression for the frequent issuers.
We notice that the macroeconomic variable representing the slope of the yield curve appears insignificant, while the variable measuring the level of short end interest rates remains highly significant. Credit risk premium variable BBBAAA has also lost its explanatory power in the regression, while the size of the issue, the number of bookrunners involved in the sale of the bond and the annualised coupon are found statistically significant at a 5% level. Speculative-grade issuers are absent from the category and no debt issues of junior status have been made by issuers categorised as frequent. All signs remain as expected. Similar to the infrequent issues subgroup with 4-6 issues, the credit quality yields no apparent separation in maturity for frequent issuers, apart from the highest rated AAA-category. Adjusted R-squared values vary between 0.44 and 0.58 for the regressions with industry fixed effects included.
Robustness check
Of the total number of 24 industry sectors, only nine are present in the frequent issuer category, signifying strong variability between industries to issue bonds. Macroeconomic variables do not show any significant changes compared with industry fixed effects regression. The first apparent difference is the lack of significance for the SIZE-variable in the sub-groups of the repeating issuers. Secondly, we observe that the subordinated debt dummy variable appears significant for the infrequent issuer group, validating theoretical predictions by Diamond (1993) that the maturity of junior debt has longer term than senior debt. Looking at the main reputation classes, we notice that the credit rating dummies are largely insignificant for investment-grade debt, with the exception of the dummy variable representing the highest AAA-credit quality in the infrequent-issuer category. However, dummies for the speculative-grade rating categories BB, B and CCC appear significant with expected negative sign in the fullsample regressions in column I and for the infrequent issuer groups in columns III through VI. These results are interesting for a number of reasons; first, it implies that rating changes within the investment-grade credit quality segment does not have a significant affect in determining the maturity of debt for a given issuer. Secondly, firms with speculative-grade credit worthiness are significantly affected by their credit quality as a determinant of debt maturity. Third, information asymmetries are large for unrated single issuers; the OLS regression in column II shows that the dummy for unrated issuers stands out as the only statistically significant rating dummy at a 10% level with a negative coefficient. The unrated dummy in the regression on a sub-sample of firms with two bond issues in column IIII requires some attention; here, the unrated dummy variable is positive and weakly significant. The reason is that for this subgroup, the unrated issuers actually pay on average a lower coupon than the reference BBB-rated issuers, yielding a positive sign for the dummy variable.
The last column in table 7 presents the fixed effects regression for frequent issuers.
There are 142 bond issues in this category made by 16 firms. Similarly to the industry fixed effects regression, we observe that the only variables showing statistical significance are the macroeconomic variable LEVEL, the annualized coupon and the BOOKRUN-variable. None of the rating-dummies are significant, not even the unrateddummy.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
The main finding in this paper suggests that repeated bond issues bridge information gaps and firms with multiple issues are rewarded with market recognition and increase flexibility in choosing the maturity of issued debt.
Maturity choice is largely dependent on the prevailing macroeconomic conditions. I confirm previous by findings by Guedes and Opler (1996) , Baker, Greenwood and
Wurgler (2003) and Bali and Skinner (2006) that firms choose the maturity of incremental debt issues with changes in the level and slope of the yield curve. However, while this is true in the aggregate, I observe significant variations in the sensitivity to these macroeconomic conditions depending on the issuer's propensity to issue bonds.
Firms issuing bonds more frequently are less sensitive to the slope of the yield curve and the market credit risk premium when choosing the maturity of their debt.
Issuers deemed frequent or infrequent are also of higher credit quality than one-time issuers. While Bali and Skinner (2006) find substantial variation in debt maturity within credit categories, we have observed that frequent issuers and one-time issuers have a similar average maturity of issued debt, but frequent issuers display greater variation on the debt maturity for different qualities of credit. Thus, variability in maturity is not only conditional on credit quality alone, but also related to the reputation of an issuer.
Credit quality itself has a high impact on the issued maturity. I contribute to previous literature by showing for the first time that controlling for coupon payments yields a monotonically decreasing risk-maturity relationship, when omitting this control produces on non-monotonic relationship between credit quality and debt maturity similar to Diamond (1991a) . While speculative-grade quality firms issue on average longer term debt than lower investment-grade issuers, they are screened out of the longest maturity segments due to increased costs in terms of annualised coupon payments. Unlike investment-grade issuers, the frequency of issue bears no effect on the speculative-grade issuers, who do not see an increase in the variability of debt maturity for more frequent issuers. It would also appear that the most frequent, good quality issuers are neither inclined to extend their debt maturity through bond markets nor affected by general macroeconomic condition when choosing their maturity of debt. The frequent use of bond markets as a source of debt capital may be a result of firm specific funding policies, making general economic conditions a less prominent driver of maturity choice after firm-specific funding needs are considered. The higher average credit quality of frequent issuers allows them to negotiate debt issues with higher flexibility. By contrast, infrequent issuers seek the longest maturities in the market and similar to single issuers, they time the market by altering their debt maturity according to prevailing economic conditions. It may be that firms in the infrequent group have knowingly set out to build a reputation, in order to access the longer term on debt through by utilising the capital markets.
Subordination of debt is issued with a longer maturity than senior debt. Similar to theoretical predictions by Diamond (1993) , issuers of subordinated debt are of lower credit qualities, thus at a higher risk of default and a possible liquidation, which the lower debt status seeks to alleviate. The European capital markets have also had an increasing appetite for lower credit qualities and I have documented the growth of the so called junk bond market in Europe.
I have also shown that the implied credit quality of issuers without a credit rating lies on the edge of speculative-grade and investment-grade credit quality. An interesting extension to the presented empirical evidence would be to assess whether the lack of a credit rating alone determines the debt maturity available to these issuers or whether the term of debt for unrated issuers is driven by firm-specific characteristics, which the market correctly recognises. If the first alternative would turn out to be true, it would be a strong signal of the significance of credit rating agencies as agents in bridging gaps in information asymmetries on the debt capital markets. Note: The variables are defined as follows: Maturity is the maturity of bond i measured in years, Level is the 3 month EURIBOR-rate, Slope is measured as the difference between the yield of 10-year government bonds and the 3-month EURIBOR, Bbbaaa is the market credit risk premium measured as the yield spread difference between AAA-rated and BBB-rated corporate bonds observed in the market,
Coupon is the annualised fixed coupon of issue i, Size is the amount of debt issued in euros, Bookrun is the number of financial institutions involved in the sale of the transaction. Qual is a categorical variable identifying the firm's credit rating, where AAA = 1, . . . , CCC = 7 and unrated firms receive a code of 0, Sub indicates whether the issued debt is contractually subordinated (=1) or not (=0). Robust t-statistics in parentheses: *** Significant at 1% level, ** Significant at 5% level, * Significant at 10% level. AAA,…, CCC are dummy variables of corresponding credit rating categories, where the omitted base category represents BBB credit quality. Dependent variable MAT is the log of one plus the maturity in years. SIZE is the log of the amount of debt issued in euros. 
Infrequent issuers
Robust t-statistics in parentheses: *** Significant at 1% level, ** Significant at 5% level, * Significant at 10% level. AAA,…, CCC are dummy variables of corresponding credit rating categories, where the omitted base category represents BBB credit quality. Dependent variable MAT is the log of one plus the maturity in years. SIZE is the log of the amount of debt issued in euros. Robust t-statistics in parentheses: *** Significant at 1% level, ** Significant at 5% level, * Significant at 10% level. AAA,…, CCC are dummy variables of corresponding credit rating categories, where the omitted base category represents BBB credit quality. Dependent variable MAT is the log of one plus the maturity in years. SIZE is the log of the amount of debt issued in euros. 
